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Abstract
The overall picture presented by the media regarding the two day and two night Amsterdam
meeting of the Heads of State and Government in June 1997 was largely negative. The main
reason for the negativity was that the Intergovernmental Conference (“IGC”), by failing to agree on
Treaty amendments concerning the size of the Commission and the weighting system for qualified
majority voting in the Council, supposedly could not produce satisfactory responses as to the need
to reform the institutions of the European Union with a view to its next enlargement. Is this picture
justified in light of the actual outcome of the IGC? It certainly would be if the IGC’s scope had
been limited to institutional reform and if the IGC had not produced any concrete results in the
institutional field. But neither of these statements is true. One only needs to look at the changes
brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam to appreciate the extent of the reform. The purpose of
this Article is to provide such an illustrative overview of the reform, with particular emphasis on
institutional aspects. This will be done against the background of the preparation and development
of the IGC.
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The overall picture presented by the media regarding the
two day and two night Amsterdam meeting of the Heads of State
and Government in June 1997 was largely negative.' The main
reason for the negativity was that the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence ("IGC"), by failing to agree on Treaty amendments con-
cerning the size of the Commission and the weighting system for
qualified majority voting in the Council, supposedly could not
produce satisfactory responses as to the need to reform the insti-
* Director-General of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union;
Legal Adviser to the Intergovernmental Conference that negotiated and adopted the
Treaty of Amsterdam.
** Legal Adviser to the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union; Mem-
ber of the task force for the Intergovernmental Conference that negotiated and
adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The views expressed in this paper are the authors' personal views and do not in any
way commit the position of the Council of the European Union.
1. The London Financial Times editorial, on the day following the conclusion of
the Amsterdam meeting, opened with the following: "No one had great expectations
from the EU's Maastricht revision conference. But even the lowest expectations have
been disappointed by the paltry results achieved in Amsterdam yesterday morning." See
Europe Becalmed, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 1997. In a more straightforward way, the Paris
Daily Liberation carried the following front page heading on the signing of the Treaty
of Amsterdam: Le nouveau traiti europien est nul. LIBtRATION, Oct. 3, 1997. Fortunately
enough, more positive-and more reasoned-comments followed. See Editorial Com-
ments, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Neither a Bang nor a Whimper, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
767 (1997); Editorial Comments, Union Without Constitution, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1105 (1997); Elmar Brok, Kein Papiertiger: Der Vertrag von Amsterdam, VII WIRTSCHAr-
SDIENST 375 (1997); Philippe de Schoutheete, L'avenir de l'Union europienne, POLITIQUE
tTRANGkRE, No. 3, 1997, at 263; J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 3 EUR.
L.J. 309 (1997). The attitude taken by the European Parliament is also worth recalling.
In a resolution on the Treaty of Amsterdam adopted on November 19, 1997, the Parlia-
ment, regretting that the Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") had left some institu-
tional issues unresolved, nevertheless stressed that the new Treaty marked a further step
towards the construction of a European political union and recommended that the
Member States ratify it, O.J. C 371/99 (1997).
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tutions of the European Union with a view to its next enlarge-
ment.
Is this picture justified in light of the actual outcome of the
IGC? It certainly would be if the IGC's scope had been limited
to institutional reform and if the IGC had not produced any con-
crete results in the institutional field. But neither of these state-
ments is true.
One only needs to look at the changes brought about by the
Treaty of Amsterdam 2 to appreciate the extent of the reform.
The purpose of this Article is to provide such an illustrative over-
view of the reform, with particular emphasis on institutional as-
pects. This will be done against the background of the prepara-
tion and development of the IGC.
Quite curiously, this latest revision of the Treaties, while be-
ing carefully and lengthily prepared, did not have clearly de-
fined objectives. No previous IGC had been prepared with such
attention and over such a lengthy period of time. The contrast
with the hastily-prepared 1991 IGC on Political Union, which led
to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty' (or "TEU"), is striking.
Things were very different this time. In early 1995, more than
twelve months before the planned opening of the IGC, the EU
institutions were already assessing the functions of the new-born
Maastricht Treaty with a view to possibly reforming it.4 Later
2. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. For a general view
of the content of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Sally Langrish, The Treaty of Amsterdam:
Selected Highlights, 23 EUR. L. REV. 3 (1998); Koen Lenaerts & Eddy De Smijter, Le Traite
d'Amsterdam, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX DROIT EUROPtEN, Feb. 1998, at 25; THE TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Andrew Duff ed., 1997); Peter Ludlow, A View
from Brussels, A Quarterly Commentary on the EU (Center for Eur. Pol'y Stud., Brussels,
Belgium), July 1997; Philippe Manin, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1
(1998); 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPVEN (1997) (special issue devoted to the
Treaty of Amsterdam).
3. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]).
4. The report of the Council on the functioning of the Maastricht Treaty has been
published by the General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 1995. See GENERAL SECP.u-
TARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
MAASTRICHT TREATY (1995); see also E.U. BULL., no. 4, at 93 (1995) (carrying, in full,
foreword and conclusions of report by the Commission and also referring to contribu-
tions by European Parliament, Court ofJustice, and Court of First Instance); European
S331999]
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that year, a Reflection Group5 debated at length about chal-
lenges ahead and options for the forthcoming conference and
suggested an annotated agenda for the IGC.
No clear objective, however, had been established for the
IGC from the start-neither the accomplishment of the internal
market, such as the objective of the Single European Act,6 nor
establishing an economic and monetary union, one of the major
objectives of the Maastricht Treaty-apart from the few follow-
up items that were required by provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty itself (namely reviewing the common foreign and security
policy provisions7 and the scope of the European Parliament's
legislative powers'). Also clear from the start was the need for
the EMU chapter of the EC Treaty to remain off the negotiating
table, thereby avoiding any possible risk of interference with pro-
gress towards the third stage of economic and monetary union.9
Several post-Maastricht developments, however, shed more
light on the scope of the IGC, indicating some main directions
in which to take action. One development was the need to take
better account of the concerns of the citizens of the Member
States, in other words, to bring the Union closer to its citizens.
Paradoxically, the gap between the process of European integra-
Parliament Resolution on the functioning of Treaty on European Union with the pros-
pect of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, O.J. C 151/55 (1995) (reporting on
functioning of TEU).
5. The Reflection Group was set up by the European Council meeting in Corfu on
June 24-25, 1994. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 18 (1994). It was composed of representatives of
the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and chaired by Ambassador Wes-
tendorp of Spain. The Reflection Group submitted a report to the European Council
Meeting in Madrid on December 15-16, 1995. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 25 (1995). The
report of the Reflection Group has been published by the General Secretariat of the
Council, Brussels, 1996. GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, REFLECTION GROUP REPORT AND OTHER REFERENCES FOR DOCUMENTARY PUR-
POSES (1996).
6. SEA, supra note 3, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
7. TEU, supra note 3, tit. V, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
729-34.
8. Id. art. N, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739; Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 189b(8), O.J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 695 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by TEU,
supra note 3.
9. This led to the absurd consequence that the cooperation procedure, while be-
ing abolished all throughout the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), has been maintained in the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU") provi-
sions. See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 104a(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 34 (1992), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 638.
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tion and the citizens had grown wider during the period of ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, which represented the greatest
effort since the signing of the Treaties of Rome to promote a
People's Europe. 10 Eventually, the Member States felt the need
to address that gap at the EU level, and in concrete terms, by
confronting issues such as unemployment, health, environment,
equality between men and women, and openness.
Another element that called for action was the need to re-
form the Union's institutional structure in order to prepare it
for an enlarged European Union of twenty-five or more mem-
bers. Furthermore, while the Reflection Group considered that
the IGC should focus on necessary changes rather than embark-
ing on a complete revision of the Treaty, Member States kept
piling items onto the conference tables. These items ranged
from the status of churches, to animal welfare, to voluntary ser-
vice activities to sport,11 thereby making the IGC agenda man-
agement much more difficult.
Confronted with such a large and diverse agenda, the IGC
took some time-after its formal opening in Turin on March 29,
1996-before getting into the real negotiating business. In
1996, the successive Italian and Irish presidencies respectively
took stock of the issues on the table and submitted a first outline
for a draft revision of the Treaties. In the early months of 1997,
the Dutch presidency initiated the final effort to bring the IGC
to a successful conclusion in Amsterdam. 12 The Presidency had
10. It is worth recalling that it was the Treaty on European Union ("TEU" or
"Maastricht Treaty") that introduced a new Part Two to the EC Treaty specifically de-
voted to the "Citizenship of the Union," setting out the rights related thereto (right to
move and to reside freely within the territory of the Member States; right to vote and to
stand at municipal and European elections in the country of residence; right to protec-
tion abroad by diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State; right to petition
the European Parliament; right to apply to a European Ombudsman). EC Treaty, supra
note 8, pt. 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 10-11 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 593-94. The Maas-
tricht Treaty also introduced specific provisions for Community action in fields such as
education, vocational training and youth, culture, and consumer protection to the EC
Treaty. Id. arts. 126-129a, Oj. C 224/1, at 45-48 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 657-63.
11. The diversity of the IGC agenda is reflected in the great number of declara-
tions that are attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam (fifty-nine, plus thirteen protocols).
See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, O.J. C 340/1, at 92-144 (1997).
12. The Italian Presidency submitted a progress report on the IGC to the Euro-
pean Council meeting in Florence in June 1996, which asked the Irish Presidency to
prepare a draft outline for the Maastricht Treaty revision for discussion at the Dublin
European Council in December 1996. A collection of the most significant documents
relating to the ICC proceedings during the Italian, Irish, and Dutch presidencies semes-
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to accept, however, that all the problems were not going to be
settled because some Member States believed that time was not
ripe for decisions as regards certain sensitive issues on the table.
I. THE OUTCOME OF THE IGC: MAIN ASPECTS OF THE
AMSTERDAM TREATY
The main changes to the Treaties agreed to in Amsterdam
may be grouped into four areas: the subject matters currently
referred to under the heading "the Union and the citizens"; the
free movement of persons and internal security; the external ac-
tion of the European Union; and the institutional issues. In this
respect, the IGC may thus be regarded as having fulfilled the
mandate it received from the Heads of State and Government
meeting in Turin in March, 1996: the mandate requested the
IGC to focus its work on those areas.
This Article will not dwell on the new employment chapter 13
and the improved social policy provisions" because both will be
covered separately.15 However, their paramount importance to
the overall outcome of the IGC should be stressed. They provide
evidence that the citizens' concerns are high on the list of the
European Union's priorities.' 6
ters have been published by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European
Union, Brussels, in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
13. New Title Via as introduced in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam. See
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(19), O.J. C 340/1, at 33-34 (1997) (inserting
tit. Via into EC Treaty); Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, tit. VIII, O.J. C 340/3, at 235-36 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 107 (not yet ratified)
[hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] (tit. Via of EC Treaty), incorporating changes made
by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the EC
Treaty will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the
European Community ("Consolidated EC Treaty"). Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art.
12, OJ. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997). This title notably provides for coordination at the
Community level of the Member States' employment policies, which will have to take
account of Community guidelines and whose implementation will be assessed by the
Community with a view to ensure consistency.
14. The Treaty of Amsterdam marks the end of the United Kingdom's "social opt-
out" and the incorporation of the Maastricht Agreement on social policy into the EC
Treaty. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(22), O.J. C 340/1, at 35-39 (1997)
(replacing arts. 177-20 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, arts. 136-
43, OJ. C 340/3, at 239-43 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 109-11 (arts. 177-20 of EC Treaty).
15. See Patrick Venturini, Social Policy and Employment Aspects of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, 22 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. S94 (1998).
16. The relevance of the Amsterdam European Council proceedings on growth
and employment is generally underscored when assessing the outcome of the Amster-
dam meeting. The adoption of two Resolutions, one regarding the implementation of
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Equally important are the Treaty changes related to the
area of freedom, security, and justice. The so-called "communa-
turization" of matters such as asylum, immigration, and visas,
which presently fall under Title VI of the TEU-the so-called
"third pillar"-is a significant step forward. Through these
Treaty changes, Community rules and procedures will apply,
with some transitional arrangements,17 to areas directly related
to the Community objective of free movement of persons. 8
Although police and judicial cooperation will remain largely "in-
tergovernmental," nevertheless they will be able to avail them-
selves of an enhanced range of legal instruments.1 9 A larger role
the Stability and Growth Pact, the other on Growth and Employment, greatly contrib-
uted to paving the way for the final stage of economic and monetary union, and for
unblocking the IGC negotiations, thus allowing the European Union to keep the sched-
ule planned for the opening of the enlargement process. See Resolution of the Euro-
pean Council on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17 June 1997, Amsterdam, O.J. C
236/1 (1997); Resolution of the European Council on Growth and Employment of 16
June 1997, Amsterdam, O.J. C 236/3 (1997).
17. During a transitional period of five years, the Council will act unanimously and
the Commission will have to examine any request made by a Member State when it
submits a proposal. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(15), O.J. C 340/1, at
31 (1997) (inserting art. 73o(1) into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note
13, art. 67(1), O.J. C 340/3, at 203 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 91 (art. 73o(1) of EC Treaty).
After that period, the co-decision procedure shall apply to all or parts of the areas
covered by the new EC Treaty Title if the Council so decides by unanimity. See Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(15), O.J. C 340/1, at 32 (1997) (inserting 73o(2) into
EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 67(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 204
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 91 (art. 73o(2) of EC Treaty).
18. New Title Ila on Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other policies related to the
Movement of Persons, as introduced in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam. See
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(15), O.J. C 340/1, at 28-32 (1997) (inserting
tit. Ila into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, 340/3, at 200-04
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 89-91 (tit. Ila of EC Treaty). This Title provides for action to be
taken to ensure the abolition of any controls on persons, when crossing internal bor-
ders, as well as for related flanking measures with respect to external border control,
asylum, and immigration. Under the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom
and Ireland, those two Member States are allowed not to participate in the adoption of
measures promulgated pursuant to this Title, and are not bound thereby. Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra note 2, Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland,
O.J. C 340/1, at 99-100 (1997). They may, however, at any time, notify the President of
the Council of their willingness to participate. Id., OJ. C 340/1, at 99 (1997). Special,
and rather peculiar, opt-out provisions have also been made for Denmark regarding its
non-participation in the new Title of the EC Treaty and in parts of the Schengen acquis,
which would be determined to fall within that Title. Id., Protocol on the position of
Denmark, O.J. C 340/1, at 101-02 (1997). These Protocols, which were tabled at the
last minute, could not be properly assessed from a legal point of view.
19. SeeTreaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(11), O.J. C 340/1, at 18-19 (1997)
(replacing art. K.6 of TEU); Consolidated version on the Treaty on European Union,
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will be played in this area by the European Parliament and the
Commission. The Court of Justice itself will also have far wider
jurisdiction than it has at present on the acts adopted under the
"third pillar. ' 2' The achievements of the Schengen Agree-
ment, 21 establishing free movement of persons among thirteen
Member States, will be incorporated into the framework of the
Union.22
Account has been taken of the specific position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland, which will be entitled to retain
their own border controls and will not be bound by the new EC
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons, but may accept
them, at any time, as well as join the Schengen acquis and the
initiatives building upon it. 2 3
For sure, such an intricacy of provisions, transitional ar-
rangements, and opt-outs, sometimes cross-referring to one an-
art. 34, O.J. C 340/2, at 164-65 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 74-75 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter
Consolidated TEU] (art. K.6 of TEU), incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amster-
dam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the TEU will be renum-
bered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Treaty of Amster-
dam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
20. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1 (11), O.J. C 340/1, at 19-20 (1997)
(replacing art. K.7 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 35, O.J. C 340/2, at
165-66 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 75 (art. K.7 of TEU).
21. Schengen Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of controls at the common frontiers, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68, 73
(1991). The Schengen Agreement has subsequently been amended several times, nota-
bly to include all the Member States except the United Kingdom and Ireland.
22. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis
into the framework of the Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 93-96 (1997). Under the terms of
the Protocol, the appropriate legal bases (in the EC Treaty or in Title VI of the TEU)
for the provisions that constitute the Schengen acquis (as identified in the Annex to the
Protocol) have to be determined by a unanimous Council decision; pending such deci-
sion the Schengen acquis shall be regarded as based on Title VI of the TEU. Prepara-
tory work is under way within the Council with a view to preparing that decision, as well
as to implementing two other provisions of the Protocol, concerning, on one side, the
association of Iceland and Norway to the implementation and further development of
the Schengen acquis, and, on the other side, the integration of the Schengen Secreta-
riat into the General Secretariat of the Council. Id. arts. 6-7, O.J. C 340/1, at 95-96
(1997).
23. Under the Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the
Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and Ireland,
those Member States shall continue to exercise border controls and to maintain the
existing "Common Travel Area" arrangements. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, Pro-
tocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty establishing the
European Community to the United Kingdom and Ireland, O.J. C 340/1, at 97-98
(1997).
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other, is not likely to make this part of the Treaty the best candi-
date for the "readability award." It is indeed an awful piece of
Treaty drafting.
The Treaty changes concerning fundamental rights are of
particular importance. Judicial control of respect for fundamen-
tal rights is made explicit with regard to action by the institu-
tions,24 and, for the first time, sanctions are made possible, in
the form of the suspension of certain rights deriving from the
Treaty, in the event of serious and persistent breaches of funda-
mental rights by a Member State.25 Member States have also
agreed on new provisions to combat discrimination and to pro-
mote equality between men and women. 26
24. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(9), O.J. C 340/1, at 9 (1997) (art.
F(2) of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 6(2), O.J. C 340/2, at 153 (1997),
37 I.L.M. at 69 (art. F(2) of TEU). Article F(2) of the TEU, now renumbered as Article
6(2), which provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the 1950 Rome European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community law, shall be subject to the Court of
Justice jurisdiction according to Article L of the TEU as amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(13), OJ. C 340/1, at 23-24
(1997) (replacing art. L of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 46, O.J. C
340/2, at 170 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (art. L. of TEU). At present, the Court has no
jurisdiction in this respect, although, as shown by a well-established case law, it does not
refrain from reviewing the action of the Community institutions in light of fundamental
rights as referred above.
25. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(9), O.J. C 340/1, at 9 (1997)
(inserting art. F.1 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 7, O.J. C 340/2, at
153 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 69 (art. F.1 of TEU). The far-reaching importance of that
provision with regards to the Union's commitment to fundamental rights should be
stressed, as it allows action to be taken against a Member State responsible for a serious
and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles on which the Union is
founded. Should a determination of a breach be made, the Member State in question,
while continuing to be bound by all the obligations arising under the treaties, might be
suspended from the benefit of certain rights deriving from the application of the
Treaty, including its voting rights.
26. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(7), OJ. C 340/1, at 26 (1997)
(inserting art. 6a into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 13, O.J. C
340/3, at 185 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 82 (art. 6a of EC Treaty). The Community will be
empowered to take action to combat a wide range of discrimination, as based on sex,
race or ethnicity, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. Under Article
119 of the EC Treaty, the Community will be able to take positive action to ensure the
application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and
women in matters of employment and occupation. The promotion of equality between
men and women has also been emphasized in the EC Treaty as a general objective. See
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, arts. 2(2)-(3), O.J. C 340/1, at 24-25 (1997) (replac-
ing art. 2 of EC Treaty and amending art. 3 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty,
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The main changes in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy ("CFSP") chapter concern decision-making. 27 The role of
the European Council will be enhanced in defining "common
strategies, and qualified majority voting will become the rule
for implementing decisions, although any member of the Coun-
cil will have the possibility to oppose a decision for important
and stated reasons of national policy.29 Moreover, while una-
nimity remains the rule for all policy decisions, the possibility
will be allowed for "constructive abstention," intended to allow a
member of the Council to let a decision be taken while not be-
ing obliged to apply it, thereby reducing the risk of deadlock."
These changes, together with the creation of a High Representa-
tive for CFSP, who will be the Secretary-General of the Council,3
and the setting up of a policy planning and early warning unit in
the General Secretariat of the Council,3 2 are intended to allow
for a more effective and coherent foreign policy of the Union,
subject of course to the political will to act in common.
Similar changes were anticipated, but could not be made, in
the field of economic relations with third countries. No agree-
ment could be found to improve decision-making and represen-
tation in order to give the Community the tools to defend the
interests of its Member States, in keeping with the evolving
needs of multilateral trade negotiations. 3
supra note 13, arts. 2, 3(c), O.J. C 340/3, at 181 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (arts. 2 & 3(c) of
EC Treaty).
27. For an overall presentation of the new common foreign and security policy
provisions, see Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty of Amsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening Enlargement Process, 22 FOROHAM
INT'L L.J. S174 (1998).
28. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1 (10), O.J. C 340/1, at 10-11 (1997)
(replacingJ.3 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 13, O.J. C 340/2, at 156
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 70 (art. J.3 of TEU).
29. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1 (10), O.J. C 340/1, at 14-15 (1997)
(inserting art. J.13, 2 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 23, 2, O.J. C
340/2, at 160-61 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72-73 (art. J.13, 2 of TEU).
30. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1 (10), O.J. C 340/1, at 14-15 (1997)
(inserting art. J.13, 1 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 23, 1, O.J. C
340/2, at 160 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72 (art. J.13, 1 of TEU).
31. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(10), O.J. C 340/1, at 13 (1997)
(replacing art.J.8(3) of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 18(3), O.J. C 340/
2, at 159 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72 (art. J.8(3) of TEU).
32. Treaty of Amsterdam supra note 2, Declaration on the establishment of a pol-
icy planning and early warning unit, O.J. C 340/1, at 132 (1997).
33. Member States thus failed to draw any lesson from Opinion 1/94 of the Court
of Justice of November 15, 1994, on the competence of the Community to conclude
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Finally, the IGC produced an effort of simplification of the
Treaties to meet the request for greater readability of the basic
texts of the European Union. As a result of that effort, many
obsolete provisions have been deleted,34 Treaty articles have
been renumbered,35 and a consolidated version of the main trea-
ties is now available to the public.36
On balance, and in light of the IGC outcome as illustrated,
the Treaty of Amsterdam can indeed be regarded as a step for-
ward on many substantive issues, although arguably, in some ar-
eas, a more decisive step would have been welcome. The empha-
sis on the fundamental principles upon which the European
Union is founded; the progressive shift towards "communa-
turization" of matters related to free movement of persons; and
the larger scope of provisions, be they in the fields of public
health or social policy, which are most likely to have an impact
on the citizens' everyday life, are many elements to be entered
"on the assets side" of the IGC.
II. THE OUTCOME OF THE IGC: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The failure by the Heads of State and Government to agree
upon any amendment to the composition of the Commission
and to the weighting of votes in the Council cannot by itself be
the only measure of the outcome of the IGC on this chapter. It
is true that those two issues were rightly regarded as important in
order to keep the institutions effective in an enlarged Union, in
international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual prop-
erty, which confirmed that the EC Treaty had not conferred upon the Community such
a general competence. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 5267, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205. No
agreement could be reached to extend the scope of application of Article 113 of the EC
Treaty. All the IGC could agree on is to add an enabling clause to Article 113 to allow
the Council to decide unanimously on such an extension, which one could regard as a
simplified procedure for amending the provision concerned. See Treaty of Amsterdam,
supra note 2, art. 2(20), OJ. C 340/1, at 25 (1997) (inserting art. 113(5) into EC
Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 133(5), O.J. C 340/3, at 238
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 108 (art. 113(5), of EC Treaty).
34. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 6, O.J. C 340/1, at 58-69 (1997).
35. Id. art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
36. Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, O.J. C 340/2, at 145 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67;
Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, O.J. C 340/3, at 173 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79. The
High Contracting Parties also agreed that the technical work undertaken during the
IGC would continue with the aim of drafting a consolidation of all the relevant treaties,
including the Treaty on European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, Declara-
tion on the consolidation of the Treaties, O.J. C 340/1, at 140 (1997).
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particular by limiting or reducing the size of the Commission
and by improving the democratic representation of votes in the
Council." It is not, however, surprising that some European
leaders clearly preferred to wait and see a clearer picture of the
next enlargement before committing themselves to reforms that
involve acute political sensitivities-consider the importance for
"small" Member States of having a national as a member of the
Commission-which may have a strong impact on national elec-
torates.
Still, the Treaty of Amsterdam is not silent on those issues.
The Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlarge-
ment offers a sound basis for an agreement."
Agreeing on the further extension of qualified majority vot-
ing may prove harder to achieve because the scope for possible
increase is now restricted to certain issues that the Member
States regard as sensitive: areas where unanimous voting in the
Council remains the rule include State aids, tax harmonization,
culture, industry, and structural funds, as well as some specific
aspects of the social and environment policies.
On balance, however, it should be readily acknowledged
that the IGC outcome is fairly positive for the institutions. It suf-
fices to recall that, when negotiations began, there were clear
indications that some Member States would seek to reduce the
powers of the most "supranational" institutions or, at least, op-
37. In a declaration attached to the IGC Final Act, Belgium, France, and Italy
stated their view that the Treaty of Amsterdam does not meet the need for substantial
progress towards reinforcing the institutions; they stressed that such reinforcement-
which should also include a larger recourse to qualified majority voting-is an indis-
pensable condition for the conclusion of the enlargement negotiations. Treaty of Am-
sterdam, supra note 2, Declaration by Belgian, France, and Italy on the Protocol on the
institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, O.J. C 340/1, at
144 (1997).
38. Under the terms of the Protocol, the Commission shall comprise one national
of each of the Member States upon the entry into force of the next enlargement of the
Union (which means that the five Member States now having the possibility of nominat-
ing a second Commissioner would give that possibility up); however, this would be sub-
ject to the Member States agreeing to amend the majority voting system, whether by re-
weighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all and notably
compensating those Member States that would give up the possibility of nominating a
second member of the Commission. Moreover, a new IGC is to be convened at least
one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty in order to
carry out a comprehensive review of the Treaty provisions on the composition and func-
tioning of the institutions. Id., Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlarge-
ment of the European Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 111 (1997).
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pose any increase thereof. Overall, the institutions have been
strengthened and the decision-making process streamlined.
As opposed to other international organizations, the consti-
tutional features of the European Union have been enhanced in
the following ways:
* The powers of the European Parliament have been in-
creased:
" its role as co-legislator has been acknowledged by
amendments to the co-decision procedure that will
put the Parliament on an equal footing with the
Council;39
* the extent to which the Parliament is involved in co-
legislation has been extended by enlarging the scope
of the co-decision procedure; 40
" the obligation of consultation has been introduced
for third pillar measures, whereas the Parliament is
only informed at present;4' and
* greater powers have been conferred upon the Parlia-
ment as to the procedure for selecting the President
of the Commission, whose nomination will be subject
to approval by the Parliament.42
* The powers of the Court of Justice have also been ex-
tended:
39. Under Article 189b of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
should the European Parliament and the Council disagree on draft legislation, the pro-
cedure would end. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(44), O.J. C 340/1, at
45-46 (1997) (replacing art. 189b of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13,
art. 251, O.J. C 340/3, at 279-80 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (art. 189b of EC Treaty). At
present, the Council can still confirm its original common position, which is adopted
unless the Parliament, acting by a very high majority, votes it down.
40. The co-decision procedure will apply to all areas where the cooperation proce-
dure-which was introduced by the Single European Act-applies at present, except
for the Economic and Monetary Union provisions. The co-decision procedure will also
apply in a certain number of new areas, where the need for democratic participation in
the decision-making process was particularly felt, such as employment, social policy,
public health, data protection, transparency, and fight against fraud.
41. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(11), O.J. C 340/1, at 20 (1997)
(replacing art. K.6 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 39(1), O.J. C 340/2,
at 167 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 76 (art. K11(1) of TEU).
42. The nomination by the governments of the Member States of the person
whom they intend to appoint as President of the Commission will have to be approved
by the European Parliament. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(40), O.J. C
340/1, at 44 (1997) (replacing art. 158(2) of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra
note 13, art. 214(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 268 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 123 (art. 158(2) of EC
Treaty).
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" in relation to the safeguarding of fundamental
rights;
43
" in relation to the new EC Treaty title on the free
movement of persons;44 and
" in relation to third pillar matters.45
9 The Commission's role of initiative has been preserved;
the role of its President has been strengthened, both with
regards to the selection of members and to the political
guidance of the Institution,46 and its internal organization
is due to be improved.47
43. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(13), O.J. C 340/1, at 23-24 (1997)
(replacing L of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 46(d), O.J. C 340/2, at 170
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (art. L of TEU); see also note 24.
44. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(15), O.J. C 340/1, at 31 (1997)
(inserting 7 3p into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 68, O.J. C
340/3, at 204 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 91 (art. 7 3p of EC Treaty). The Court ofJustice shall
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity or interpretation of Commu-
nity acts based on the new EC Treaty Title on Visas, Asylum and Immigration, although
the possibility to refer questions to the Court of Justice will be limited to courts of last
instance and no referral will be allowed on measures related to the maintenance of law
and order and the safeguarding of internal security. Moreover, the Council, the Com-
mission, or any Member State will be able to request the Court to give a ruling on a
question of interpretation relating to the new title of the Consolidated EC Treaty
("recours dans l'interet de la loi").
45. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1 (11), O.J. C 340/1, at 19-20 (1997)
(replacing art. K.7 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 35, O.J. C 340/2, at
165-66 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 75 (art. K.7 of TEU). While at present the Court has a very
limited jurisdiction (in respect of Article K.3 conventions), with the entry into force of
the new treaty it will acquire jurisdiction:
" to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of Title VI acts,
subject to declaration of acceptance of thatjurisdiction to be made by Mem-
ber States (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Austria already
made such declaration upon the signing of the Treaty);
" to review the legality of Title VI decisions; and
" to rule on disputes between Member States regarding the interpretation
and the application of Title VI acts or between the former and the Commis-
sion regarding the interpretation and the application of Title VI conven-
tions.
46. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(40), O.J. C 340/1, at 44 (1997)
(replacing art. 158(2) of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 214,
O.J. C 340/3, at 268 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 123 (art. 158(2) of EC Treaty). The agreement
of the nominee for President is required for the nomination of other members of the
Commission. Moreover, under the amended Article 163, the first paragraph specifi-
cally provides that the Commission works "under the political guidance of its Presi-
dent." See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(41), O.J. C 340/1, at 44 (1997)
(inserting art. 163, 1 into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 219,
1, O.J. C 340/3, at 269 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (art. 163, 1 of EC Treaty).
47. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, Declaration on the organisation and func-
tioning of the Commission, 0:1. C 340/1, at 137 (1997).
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The decision-making process has been simplified by reducing
the number of legislative procedures to three4 8 and by extending
qualified majority voting. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam
has provided for a closer involvement of national parliaments in
that process. 49
Provisions have also been made for the application of the
subsidiarity and proportionality principles and for improving the
quality of the drafting of Community legislation.5 °
As for institutional changes more specifically related to the
prospect of future enlargement, although no agreement could
be reached on the reweighting of the votes in the Council nor
on the size of the Commission, it must nevertheless be recalled
that the scope of qualified majority voting has been further ex-
tended, including in CFSP matters, 51 and that the number of
Members of the European Parliament will be capped at 700.52
Finally, the possibility will exist for a smaller number of
Member States than the full membership to cooperate more
closely in specific areas within the institutional framework of the
Union. The new "flexibility" provisions represent one of the
principal features of the Treaty of Amsterdam.53 Under those
48. The three legislative procedures are consultation, co-decision, and assent. The
cooperation procedure, which was introduced by the Single European Act and main-
tained for certain provisions of the EC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty in spite of the
setting up of a new co-decision procedure, has been abolished (except in for a few EMU
provisions that were left untouched by the IGC).
49. The new Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union
provides for a six-week period to elapse before the Community institutions take a deci-
sion on proposals for Community or Union legislation, thus allowing national parlia-
ments' consultation procedures to take place as appropriate. Id., Protocol on the role
of national parliaments in the European Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 113-14 (1997). The
new protocol also provides for the Conference of European Affairs Committees
("COSAC") to contribute, upon request or by its own motion, to the institutional de-
bate on issues that might have a direct beaing on the rights.and freedoms of individu-
als.
50. Id., Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality, O.J. C 340/1, at 105-07 (1997) (consolidating December 1992 Edinburgh Eu-
ropean Council conclusions on those issues); id., Declaration on the quality of the
drafting of Community legislation, O.J. C 340/1, at 139 (1997).
51. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
52. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(37), O.J. C 340/1, at 43 (1997)
(inserting art. 137, 2 into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art.
189, 2, O.J. C 340/3, at 260 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 119 (art. 137, 2 of EC Treaty).
53. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(12), O.J. C 340/1, at 22-23 (1997)
(inserting tit. Via into TEU); Consolidated TEU supra note 19, tit. VI, O.J. C 340/2, at
169-70 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (tit. Va of TEU). General provisions in Title Va set out
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provisions, Member States will be allowed, if they so wish, not to
do everything together or at the same pace. The need to allow
for some flexibility, particularly with the prospect of an enlarged
and more differentiated Union, prevailed in the end over the
fear of opening the way to a two-tiered Europe, although the
very strict conditions that have been set for the operation of the
flexibility clauses allow some doubts as to the concrete possibility
to make use of them.
III. AN OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR FUTURE
Considering the timing and context of the IGC, its out-
come, as reflected in the Treaty of Amsterdam, should not be
regarded as a failure or missed opportunity. If one measures
that outcome against the various aims for which the IGC was set:
to complete the unfinished Maastricht business on CFSP and co-
decision, to bring Europe closer to its citizens, and to prepare
the Union for enlargement, one may conclude that the IGC has
basically achieved the first two. The Treaty of Amsterdam can be
considered as a further step in the continuing process of Euro-
pean integration. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam furthers
the objective set out in the preamble of the original Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community of creating an
even closer union among the peoples of Europe.54
The Treaty of Amsterdam, and the IGC that paved the way
for it, also represents a lesson in realism, showing the limits of a
process that continues to be based on treaties. The "constitu-
tional charter" of the European Union, as the Court of Justice
has defined the founding Treaties,55 can hardly be compared
the overall conditions for "flexibility" (in particular, furthering the objectives of the
Union, not affecting the acquis, concerning at least a majority of Member States.) Spe-
cific additional criteria are laid down in new Article 5a of the EC Treaty and new Article
K12 of the TEU. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(5), O.J. C 340/1, at 25
(1997) (inserting art. 5a into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art.
11, O.J. C 340/3, at 184 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 81 (art. 5a of EC Treaty); Treaty of Amster-
dam, supra note 2, art. 1(11), O.J. C 340/1, at 21-22 (1997) (inserting art. K.12 into
TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 19, art. 40, O.J. C 340/2, at 167-68 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 76 (art. K12 of TEU).
54. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, pmbl., at 11. See the first recital in the preamble of
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of March 25, 1957. Id.
The objective of creating an even closer union among the peoples of Europe was then
confirmed in the preamble (eleventh recital) of the TEU. TEU, supra note 3, pmbl.,
O.J. C 224/1, at 3 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 726.
55. See Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245.
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with the constitution of a State, although points of similarity may
be found with a federal constitution, such as that of the United
States. The European Union cannot be assimilated to a State,
nor can its institutions be compared with national ones, as peo-
ple sometimes tend to do. Although it may be a new form of
integration among States, clearly distinct from the classical
model of international organization, the European Union still
remains a union among sovereign States. This should be kept in
mind when assessing the results of constitutional reforms or dis-
cussing the issue of whether future reforms should continue to
be dependent upon the consensus of all Member States.
It is not easy to anticipate how the European Union will
evolve over the coming years. The count-down to EMU is on
and the prospect for monetary union and a single European cur-
rency presently dominates the European political debate. Credit
should be given to the Amsterdam meeting for having kept the
economic and monetary union on track. A single currency
might give further impetus to the process of political integra-
tion. In the meantime, the Treaty of Amsterdam will have en-
tered into force, hopefully with fewer difficulties than the Maas-
tricht Treaty. 6
Enlargement is the next challenge. Negotiations will open
soon with six candidate countries, although accession is not ex-
pected until a few years after the millennium.57 A new revision
of the Treaties will have to take place to complete the institu-
tional reform before enlarging the Union. At the'same time,
other reforms are being discussed, which are closely linked with
enlargement (future financing of the European Union's poli-
cies, reform of structural funds and of common agricultural pol-
icy), the whole being referred to as "Agenda 2000," a talking la-
bel for the daunting challenge which the European Union will
be facing in the months ahead.
56. Denmark and Ireland held successful popular referenda in May 1998. Ratifica-
tion in France will require amending the Constitution, as indicated by the Conseil consti-
tutionnel on December 31, 1997. OFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, Jan. 3,
1998, at 165.
57. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 1 (1997). The enlargement process was launched by the
European Council meeting in Luxembourg on December 12-13, 1997. Id. On the en-
largement of the Union, see Maganza, supra note 27.
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